


William Clark's Impossible

The Sentimental Imperialist
and the War of 1812

By Jay Buckley



William Clark stood silently,

reflecting upon his first meeting with Brulé Chief Black Bull Buffalo (Untongarabar) over a decade previous, on September 24, 1804, at the Lakota village near the mouth of the Bad River in present-day South Dakota. For three days Black Buffalo, the Partisan, and Buffalo Medicine parlayed with Lewis and Clark. On September 28, as the expedition prepared to leave, a few Lakota warriors became so heated that Clark had actually drawn his sword. Fortunately, Black Buffalo's presence prevented bloodshed. He even accompanied Lewis and Clark upstream, perhaps as a hostage, in order to discourage the Lakotas from trying to prevent the Corps of Discovery from proceeding on.¹

Now, on July 14, 1815, Clark, along with Ninian Edwards, Auguste Chouteau, and a large gathering of Lakotas (Teton Sioux), Nakotas (Yanktons), and Dakotas (Santees) gazed intently as Lakota warriors lowered Black Buffalo's body into a grave at Portage des Sioux, a peninsula of land situated between the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi rivers. Black Bull Buffalo received a full military funeral complete with a grand procession, military band and drum corps

playing, an American flag flying, and a gun salute and firing of the cannon. Omaha chief Big Elk (Ongpatonga) offered part of Black Buffalo's eulogy. "Do not grieve. Misfortunes will happen to the wisest and best men. Death will come, and always comes out of season. It is the command of the Great Spirit, and all nations and people must obey." He continued, "Be not discouraged or displeased then, that in visiting your father here [the American commissioner Clark], you have lost your chief."² A few days later on July 19, the Teton Lakotas, the Sioux of the Lakes, the Sioux of St. Peters, and the Yankton Sioux all signed treaties of peace and amity with the United States of America. William Clark conducted and signed all of those peace treaties that brought an end to the War of 1812 on the American frontier.

Largely a forgotten conflict in American memory, Americans barely noticed the War of 1812's two-hundred-year commemoration. Unlike the American Revolution, which was fought over concepts like freedom, independence, and representative government, or the Civil War, which was fought over issues of federalism (states' rights) and free-

Task



Encounter with the Teton Sioux, September 25, 1804 by James Ayers, oil on canvas, 24in x 40in

dom (slavery), the causes behind the War of 1812 are neither ideologically based, nor are they easily discernible. The causes—British naval impressment of American citizens, American neutrality during the Napoleonic Wars, native nations' relations with England and the US on the American frontier, and the possible US acquisition of new territory (Canada and Florida)—do not have the same cachet as freedom and independence. Nevertheless, the war was an event of immense importance in that it represented a second war for independence for the United States, shaped future generations of relations with Native Americans, and redefined a continent.³

After the US Senate voted 19–13 in favor on June 17, 1812, President James Madison commenced the war with a stroke of his pen, signing the congressional declaration of war into law on June 18. Many Americans must have felt like they were tempting fate. The original thirteen colonies had been blessed by what they regarded as divine providence and by extreme luck during the American Revolution. Now the seventeen states comprising the United States of



Black Buffalo's Grave, Portage des Sioux.

Photo by the author.

William Clark's Impossible Task

America once again declared war on Great Britain, the most powerful nation on earth. By whatever measure—finance, industry, international trade, military might, naval power—Great Britain represented the economic, political, and military titan of the world. For two-and-a-half years the war raged. By war's end, some 25,000 American, British, Canadian, and Native American casualties resulted from the indecisive stalemate.⁴

Today's Americans may remember hearing something about Captain Oliver Hazard Perry's naval victory on Lake Erie, the victorious Battle of Plattsburgh on Lake Champlain, the courageous defense of Fort McHenry (and the Star-Spangled Banner), or Andrew Jackson's victory at New Orleans. All of these events occurred on the northern, eastern, and southern borders of the United States. Not many would be able to discuss the implications of the war on the trans-Appalachian frontier, however, nor would they recall the subsequent peace treaties with Indian nations signed at Portage des Sioux in 1815 and at Clark's Indian office in St. Louis over the next few years, many months after the Treaty of Ghent had formally ended the war. An understanding of the war on the western flank is necessary to comprehend the implications for native nations and the expansion of America.

Historical Context

Indian nations living west of the Appalachian Mountains experienced increased settler colonialism pressure and conflict during and after the French and Indian War (1754-1763). Odawa war chief Pontiac (Ottawa) formed a pan-Indian resistance effort in the Great Lakes region against British expansion, but the effort ultimately failed. Then, during, and after the American Revolution, tribes facing east from Indian Country joined the British side in an unsuccessful attempt to temper American expansion. In the 1790s, Little Turtle (Miami) and Blue Jacket (Shawnee) formed another Indian confederacy in the Ohio Country to try to keep Americans south of the Ohio River. In 1803, the United States purchased the "Doctrine of Discovery" title to the Louisiana territory from France. The United States now felt justified to extend her sovereignty over the region, but ran up against native peoples who sought to defend their full sovereignty to the land and not just the "right of occupancy" assumed under the European discovery doctrine.⁵

The US government authorized Meriwether Lewis and William Clark to explore the Missouri River from its confluence with the Mississippi to its headwaters in the Rocky

Mountains for the purpose of finding a commercial route to the Pacific. Lewis and Clark notified native nations of America's suzerainty, acknowledging native nations' internal autonomy in exchange for recognition of America's over-arching sovereignty and trading opportunities.⁶ They distributed peace medals—tokens of sovereignty that displayed a portrait of President Thomas Jefferson on one side and the words "Peace and Friendship" on the other—to influential chiefs.⁷

The federal government's official Indian policy of fostering "peace and friendship" through commerce was implemented via the US factory system. Theoretically, these frontier posts sold or traded manufactured goods for furs and skins hunted and trapped by native customers. In reality, the extension of credit soon indebted native peoples. One method to erase debt was to cede land. Jefferson articulated this concept in a letter to Governor William Harrison on February 27, 1803:

When they withdraw themselves to the culture of a small piece of land, they will perceive how useless to them are their extensive forests, and will be willing to pare them off from time to time in exchange for necessaries for their farms and families. To promote this disposition to exchange lands, which they have to spare and we want, for necessaries, which we have to spare and they want, we shall push our trading houses, and be glad to see the good and influential individuals among them run in debt, because we observe that when these debts get beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands.... In this way our settlements will gradually circumscribe and approach the Indians, and they will in time either incorporate with us as citizens of the US, or remove beyond the Mississippi.⁸

Governor Harrison followed Jefferson's advice and demanded a huge land cession from representatives of the Sauk (Sac) and Mesquakies (Foxes) nations in a controversial 1804 treaty conducted in Saint Louis that the tribes repeatedly refused to acknowledge or accept as valid.⁹ From Harrison's perspective, the United States had acquired southern Wisconsin, western Illinois, and part of northeastern Missouri through this fifteen-million-acre cession. In 1805 General James Wilkinson constructed the Fort Belle Fontaine (Bellefontaine) factory on the south bank of the Missouri, four miles from its confluence with the Mississippi (some fifteen miles from St. Louis) and across from the narrow peninsula known as Portage des Sioux. This was the first American fort west of the Mississippi. It served as a government

trading house and military outpost. Its erection advanced the US government's aims to regulate private traders, counter foreign (British) designs in upper Louisiana, and provide credit, gifts, and goodwill to Indian delegations venturing to Washington.¹⁰

Following the return of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, the secretary of war appointed William Clark brigadier general of the militia and federal Indian agent for all western tribes, excluding the Osages, who had already been assigned to agent Pierre Chouteau. Having explored the Louisiana Purchase (and beyond), Clark was now given by President Jefferson the unenviable role of simultaneously protecting Indian rights and interests through trade while overseeing and advancing the dispossession of native peoples' "right of occupancy" to the Louisiana Territory through land cession treaties.¹¹

Initially, Clark used Fort Belle Fontaine as his supply headquarters for the Indian trade, and the gifts he presented to Indian delegations came from its storehouses. The fort was poorly located for the Indian trade, however, and upon hearing Clark's recommendations, the War Department agreed to close the Belle Fontaine factory and construct two new trading houses, Fort Osage and Fort Madison, to better serve the Indians along the Missouri and Mississippi rivers. President Jefferson expected the factories on the Missouri and Mississippi would "have more effect than as many armies." Opening commerce with the Indians would supposedly enable the tribes to become allies and help "prohibit the British from appearing westward of the Mississippi."¹²

In the summer of 1808, Clark sent Colonel Thomas Hunt to oversee the construction of Fort Madison, located above the Mississippi's rapids near its confluence with the Des Moines River, to promote goodwill among the Winnebagoes, Sacs, and Foxes.¹³ Meanwhile, also in 1808, Clark oversaw the design, location, and construction of Fort Clark (Fort Osage) on the Missouri River near the mouth of the Osage River. Located three hundred miles above the mouth of the Missouri and twenty-five miles east of present-day Kansas City, Fort Osage represented the westernmost of the twenty-eight factories and served as a government trading house and a military outpost. George Sibley served as factor, while the fort itself offered a commanding position one hundred feet above the river. All passing watercraft fell within gun range.¹⁴

After summoning the Great and Little Osages—the Ni-U-Ko'n-Ska, or Children of the Middle Waters—to meet on

the Fire Prairie, Clark drafted his first federal treaty. Over-anxious to demonstrate his abilities as an Indian agent, Clark pressed chiefs White Hair (Paw-Hiu-Skah or Pawhuska) and Walking Rain (Nichenmanee) and the Osage nation to agree to his terms. The Osage leaders welcomed American promises of protection against their enemies, especially the Sac and Fox, and looked forward to a trading post on the Missouri. They may have also thought they were exchanging only their rights to hunt on the land east of Fort Osage, which had settlements of Quapaws, Cherokees, and French settlers anyway. Clark took advantage of the situation to wrest from the Osages all of their land claims east of a line extending south from Fort Osage to the Arkansas River (half of present-day Missouri and Arkansas) and south of a line between Fort Osage and Fort Madison. Clark's thinly veiled threats to punish them for past depredations were offset by his declarations that the United States wished peaceful trade and friendship with the Osages, and his promise "to protect all orderly friendly & well-disposed Indians . . . who will Strictly attend to and preserve the counsels of the President of the U. States through his Agents." Clark helped to dispossess the Osages of fifty thousand square miles of land for ten cents per square mile—land that the government could turn around and sell for \$1.25 to \$2.50 an acre.¹⁵

When some of the tall, proud Osage warriors not present at the initial treaty protested its terms, Governor Meriwether Lewis asked Pierre Chouteau to present a slightly altered treaty to the tribe for approval, with an annual annuity payment of \$1,200 and \$1,500 in merchandise. Chouteau convinced the tribes to sign. Clark defended his actions to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn: "No unfair means had been taken on my part to induce the Osage to seed to the United States such an extensive Country for what is conceived here to be so small a Compensation, when in reality their Compensation when taken into proper view is fully adequate."¹⁶

Indian agent Clark had fulfilled the objectives and desires of his superiors by clearing Indian title to lands cheaply, even when it meant offering an unfair settlement to the tribes involved. At the time, Clark boasted to his brother Jonathan that he had extinguished the Osages' right of occupancy to three hundred miles of Missouri "fer a verry Small Sum."¹⁷ Later, after years of experience as an Indian diplomat, a wiser and more reflective Clark apologetically told Ethan Allen Hitchcock, who was serving as a temporary aide in Clark's St. Louis office, that the Osage treaty "was the hardest treaty on the Indians he ever made and that if he was to be damned

hereafter it would be for making that treaty.”¹⁸ Perhaps Clark “had reason to fear a tenure in hell, because he admitted to complicity in political manipulations that contributed to the exaggerated accusations of Osage ‘depredations’ to advance American interests.”¹⁹

Indians willing to sign treaties faced opposition within their nations. Osage bands on the Arkansas, such as the one led by Clermont, scoffed at White Hair’s agreement, thinking him an American pawn, and undermined his credibility among the dissidents. It was clear to them that land-hungry Americans possessed an insatiable desire to divest Indians of their land and paid little attention to the legal and moral implications of the seizures. This opposition to land dispossession found a powerful voice in the Shawnee leader Tecumseh, who in an 1810 speech articulated a firm stance for all Indians to take against future land cessions. When there were “no white man on this continent,” he began, the land “all belonged to the red men . . . placed on it by the Great Spirit.” The Indians were a “happy race,” but had since been “made miserable by the white people, who are never contented, but always encroaching.” The only way “to stop this evil, is, for all the red men to unite in claiming a common and equal right in the land.” Furthermore, no tribe “has a right to sell, even to each other, much less to strangers” and the “white people have no right to take the land from the Indians, because they had it first; it is theirs.” Moreover, “Any sale not made by all is not valid. . . . It requires all to make a bargain for all.”²⁰

On the eve of the War of 1812, Indian resistance to Anglo-American expansion coalesced under the leadership of Tecumseh and his prophet-brother Tenskwatawa. Seeking native solutions to European land encroachment, these Shawnee leaders preached independence from American sovereignty. With covert British support, they hoped to create an independent Indian state bordered by the Great Lakes on the north and the Mississippi and Ohio rivers to the west and south. Their pan-Indian movement gained momentum among some tribal communities, such as the Delawares, Ioways, Kickapoos, Miamis, Otos, Piankashaws, Potawatomis, Sacs and Foxes, Shawnees, Wabash, Weas, Winnebagos, and Wyandots. Fully half of these tribes fell under Clark’s supervision.

The summer of 1813 brought additional responsibilities to Clark. President James Madison offered Clark the governorship of the Missouri Territory, with an annual salary of \$2,000. Due to hostilities emanating from the War of 1812,

Madison called upon Clark to serve his nation by governing and defending the western frontier and the Missouri Territory from British intrigues and native resistance.²¹ As the territorial governor and *ex-officio* superintendent of Indian affairs, Clark retained all of his former duties as Indian agent and was additionally responsible for the Indian tribes in the Missouri Territory (present-day Missouri, Arkansas, and parts of Oklahoma and Kansas), and all the tribes west of the Mississippi River in the Louisiana Purchase north of the state of Louisiana since they fell under no other territorial jurisdiction.

Clark’s first act was to assess the resources at his disposal. He wrote to William Morrison, the military contractor for the district, to determine the stock of supplies such as pork, beef, soap, candles, flour, and bacon at Portage des Sioux and at St. Louis. He contacted his agents and asked for an accounting of “every species of public property in your possession,” and requested them to compile a “report of the disposition situation & number of Indians within the bounds of your agency, stating such as are friendly towards the United States, such as may be reasonably suspected of intruding to join in the war against us, and such as are actually at war with us.” Clark wanted an accounting of depredations, numbers of people killed, numbers of prisoners, and time and place of property taken. Finally, he asked for an accounting of Indian grievances and claims, both tribal and individual, against citizens of the United States so that he could take appropriate action.²²

Clark’s agents informed him that the Potawatomis, Kickapoos, and other tribes along the Illinois River and near the Great Lakes had allied themselves with the British. One of his ablest agents, Thomas Forsyth, informed him the British had given their allies a “large quantity of supplies,” and the Indians’ periodic victories against the United States had made them confident that “with the assistance of the British they will be able to drive the Americans across the Ohio River.” Other tribes, including the Ottawas, Chippewas, Menominees, and Piankashaws, were “now at war with us.”²³ Forsyth delivered a sobering account of the numerous murders and depredations committed by both sides during the war. Another agent, Nicholas Boilvin, provided Clark with an accounting of supplies on hand as well as information about which Indians were friendly, hostile, or neutral.

British agents recruited Indian allies to fight against Americans. The British, unlike the Americans, employed Indian auxiliaries to great advantage. After Harrison’s early defeat of Sac and Fox forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe in November 1811, Indian forces successfully raided

so orders were given for General Benjamin Howard and the First Infantry stationed in the West to evacuate to support the northern and eastern fronts.²⁸ Clark sent his pregnant wife, Julia, and their two sons Meriwether Lewis and William Preston Clark to Fincastle, Virginia, for safety and the eventual birth of their daughter Mary Margaret. About two months after Mary's birth, Julia expressed concern about her husband, commenting in a letter, "I am afraid we shall have some trouble in the spring with the Indians as the rangers' (who now protect the frontier) time will expire in May and instead of more troops being sent on to protect us it is hourly expected that the first regiment will be ordered from this place to Canada. God only knows what our fate is to be."²⁹ In addition to the blockhouses and patrols, Clark anticipated that he might punish Indians who had been plundering traders on the Mississippi and squelch any attack planned on the Mississippi by capturing and occupying the strategic location of Prairie du Chien, located adjacent to the confluence of the Wisconsin and Mississippi Rivers.³⁰ Robert Dickson's Indian alliance of warriors from the Sioux, Winnebagos, Menominees, Chippewas, Sacs, and Foxes had gathered at Prairie du Chien. They had plundered or burned all the American property they could find there and at other trading locations along the Mississippi. Nathaniel Pryor of the Lewis and Clark Expedition had built a trading post near the Winnebago nation near present-day Galena, Illinois. Clark assigned Alexander Willard (also from the expedition) to carry military dispatches from St. Louis to Prairie du Chien, as well as to warn Pryor of the outbreak of the war. A party of Winnebago warriors fired upon Willard's party and an "American Family of women & children was killed on the bank of the Mississippi, a few minits before the Express passed the house."³¹ Native forces also closed down nearly all of the lead mines along the upper Mississippi, resulting in shortages of and inflated prices on crude lead.³²

Nobody, in fact, really knew whether Indians or whites held the upper hand. During the war, neither side controlled the frontier. Isolated attacks and retaliatory raids simultaneously enraged and struck terror in tribal villages and frontier settlements alike. Clark generally blamed the British for assisting and strengthening anti-American Indian forces. These Anglo-Indian alliances were based, in large measure, on the industrial and commercial superiority of the British, who supplied more and better goods at British-occupied trading depots than their American counterparts could offer elsewhere. Since Jay's Treaty in 1795, British traders had operated freely

on American soil south of Canada so long as they promised to obey American laws. With enforcement minimal to nonexistent, the British fanned Indians' fears that Americans' land hunger could never be satiated and would result in the dispossession of Indian nations from their ancestral lands. Some Britons, including Robert Dickson, encouraged all Indians between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River to join together in resisting the American advance on the frontier. The British advantage in these areas allowed them to gain many Indian proponents.³³

Uncertainty, rumors, and false reports caused more anxiety than actual skirmishes. Clark focused his attention and meager resources closer to home, where the chances for success loomed brighter. With the American military presence severely diminished in the West and with British sympathizers and fur traders dominating Green Bay and Prairie du Chien, Clark sought to remedy the increased vulnerability of Missouri Territory, brought about by the abandonment of Fort Madison, by taking matters into his own hands. At stake were alliances with the Sioux, Sacs, Foxes, Kickapoos, and Winnebagos, control of the fur trade centers at Green Bay and Prairie du Chien, and navigation of the upper Mississippi. Americans were not content to let control of the upper Mississippi go unchallenged. Governor Ninian Edwards of Illinois and General Benjamin Howard sent rangers into the upper Illinois country to punish the Indians responsible for an attack on Portage des Sioux. Tragically, differentiating between the guilty and the innocent, especially during times of war, proved impossible. The rangers rampaged through Indian villages, destroying them, and erected a fortification on the right bank of the Illinois River at Peoria. This fort, called Fort Clark after William Clark's older brother George Rogers Clark, helped protect the Illinois frontier and bring some peace of mind to St. Louis during the winter of 1813.³⁴

After the winter of 1813, Clark tried once again to establish peace with the Sacs and Foxes. During the summer, he sent Nicholas Boilvin and John Johnson to invite the Indians to a council at St. Louis. Howard intercepted several of the bands headed downstream and told them to wait for Clark at Portage des Sioux. Clark succeeded in persuading the friendly portion of the tribes to relocate to northern Missouri, where Johnson opened up a factory nearby for their use on Moniteau Creek in Howard County. Although many chose to return to the Rock Island country adjacent to the Mississippi in central Illinois, a few remained. The summer of 1814, however, proved that Clark's efforts to achieve peace

with the Sacs had not been successful. Hostilities that year claimed as many victims in Missouri Territory as in the previous two years combined. Sac warriors attacked Johnson's factory on Moniteau Creek. Half a dozen settlers were murdered in or near their cabins, and the bodies of white men who had been stabbed, tomahawked, and scalped floated down the Missouri. Cries for revenge escalated to new heights. The *Missouri Gazette* emphatically stated, "The BLOOD of our citizens cry aloud for VEN-GEANCE. The general cry is let the north as well as the south be JACKSONIZED."³⁵

With General Howard and the First Infantry in the East, citizens implored Clark to do something. The War Department had deprived territorial executives of their military authority in 1814, and Missouri fell under the jurisdiction of the Eighth Military District. Governor Clark was officially encouraged to let the army handle the territory's military affairs. Tired of waiting for some action to be taken and wishing to convince Missourians that he had their protection foremost in his mind, however, Clark prepared to invade the British stronghold on the upper Mississippi. Acting on his own instincts and experience, Clark saw the necessity of establishing a strong fort at the strategic location of Prairie du Chien, located at the confluence of the Wisconsin and Mississippi rivers. This private venture, like the exploits of George Rogers Clark a few decades earlier, could have ruined Clark and personally cost him thousands of dollars if the government had chosen not to honor his drafts. Unable to wait for direction or approval from the secretary of war, Clark mobilized two gunboats to proceed up the Mississippi.³⁶ One of them, the *Governor Clark*, sported fourteen swivel cannon, was propelled by thirty-two oars, and had planking thick enough to stop musket balls. The construction of the gunboats demonstrated Clark's military acumen when it came to solving the problem of safely transporting men and supplies



Andrew Jackson returning to Tennessee after the Battle of New Orleans by Michael Haynes.

Courtesy Michael Haynes

into hostile territory.³⁷

Governor Clark knew that he could reestablish an American presence on the upper Mississippi by retaking Prairie du Chien. Although he believed that a garrison near Green Bay, at the mouth of the Fox River, would do more than a garrison at Prairie du Chien to prevent Canadians from trading along the Mississippi, he also realized that the capture of Prairie du Chien would "produce 'valuable effects' on the minds of the Indians." He had been pressing for permission for such an expedition for the past two years. He also regarded the seizure of Prairie du Chien as "indispensable to hold the British Traders in check."³⁸ With the rangers' enlistments expiring that spring, the governor recruited 150 volunteers for two months of service. On May 1, 1814, Clark and Major Zachary Taylor led a force of 50 regulars and 140 militiamen up the Mississippi, meeting only minor resistance from the Sacs at the Rock Island rapids (between modern Davenport, Iowa, and Rock Island, Illinois). Clark proceeded on to Prairie du Chien, turned his guns on the British post and captured it without firing a shot when British captain Francis Dease surrendered. On June 2, Governor Clark left Lieutenant Joseph Perkins and sixty-five men to build Fort Shelby, named after Kentucky governor Isaac Shelby. Clark designed it to have two blockhouses armed with cannons. He also left the *Governor Clark* with its eighty-man crew. Clark returned to St. Louis hopeful that the tide

of the war had turned. The city held a ball in his honor at the Missouri Hotel, and eloquent patriotic toasts calling him "the shield of the territory" were offered. The *Missouri Gazette* concluded that the campaign was well-conducted and was "more important to these territories than any hitherto undertaken."³⁹

The whole Prairie du Chien enterprise cost \$30,000. If the government had not honored Clark's drafts, it would have ruined him, much as it had his brother George Rogers Clark in a similar scenario during the American Revolution. Nonetheless, Clark's successful retaking of Prairie du Chien was short-lived. The decision to establish a garrison six hundred miles deep into hostile territory had been wishful thinking in the first place. Promised reinforcements were never sent by the war department. General Howard thought Clark a poor military commander, but William Henry Harrison insisted, "I do not hesitate to say that in the kind of warfare in which we are engaged I had rather have him [Clark] with me than any other man in the United States."⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Colonel Robert McDouall, the British official at Fort Mackinac, sent Captain William McKay and a large British and Indian force of 650 men some 400 miles to recapture Prairie du Chien. The counterattack caught Perkins and his men by surprise in the unfinished and indefensible Fort Shelby. The British fired upon the *Governor Clark*, cutting its towline and sending it floating haphazardly downstream. Perkins held out for a while but eventually surrendered the fort (renamed Fort McKay by the British) and weaponry on July 20, 1814, in exchange for safe passage by boat to St. Louis. Downstream, Major John Campbell learned that Fort Shelby was under attack and headed upstream, only to have his 120 regular troops and rangers pinned down by Black Hawk and 400 Sac, Fox, and Kickapoo warriors at the Rock Island rapids on July 21. The timely arrival of the *Governor Clark* from Prairie du Chien ended the skirmish, and Campbell and his men retired to St. Louis to regroup. A relief expedition of 350 men and eight gunboats under the command of Major Zachary Taylor was surprised by a force of well-armed Canadians and four hundred warriors at the Rock River rapids. Their attack prevented other American attempts to proceed upriver in the fall, and effectively returned the area to Indian and British control for the duration of the war.⁴¹ More bad news arrived when General Howard died in mid-September and several strategic forts were evacuated. As winter set in, Missourians braced for the possibility of renewed hostilities in the spring.

The Treaties Ending the War of 1812

Fortunately, good news reached St. Louis in the spring of 1815. British and American diplomats had reached a "Treaty of Peace and Amity between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America" at Ghent, Belgium, on Christmas Eve of 1814. The US Congress ratified the treaty on February 17, 1815, formally ending the war.⁴² Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent stated: "The United States of America engage to put an end immediately after the Ratification of the present Treaty to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such Ratification, and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities. Provided always that such Tribes or Nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their Citizens, and Subjects upon the Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such Tribes or Nations, and shall so desist accordingly."⁴³ In some ways, the frontier situation appeared more helpless than before. Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent called for the termination of hostilities and the restoration of the rights, privileges, and possessions that the Indians had held in 1811.⁴⁴ In other words, the western interests of the United States were not well served by the Treaty of Ghent.

The treaty signed in Belgium did not end hostilities on the Missouri frontier, however, particularly since the hostile bands of Sacs, Foxes, and Kickapoos led by the Indian patriot Black Hawk still roamed the countryside around the Rock River. Many white Missourians felt that the Indians should be militarily conquered and compelled to negotiate peace, but the treaty prevented the Missouri Militia and rangers from striking back. St. Louis merchant Christian Wilt concluded, "I am really apprehensive of a long & bloody war, which can only be averted by a rise *en masse* of the Americans & driving the British out of North America & slaying every Indian from here to the Rocky Mountains."⁴⁵

During the six months between the Treaty of Ghent and the negotiations at Portage des Sioux, some of the bloodiest attacks of the entire war occurred. Indians achieved victories along the river at towns such as Côte san Dessein, Loutre Island, Cap au Gris, and Femme Osage, as well as in the Boone's Lick region.⁴⁶ With no federal troops to protect the region and upward of 10,000 Indians on the Missouri and Mississippi rivers capable of war, Clark felt that he had to do

something, so he reorganized the militia with a stricter enforcement of drafts. Clark felt troubled because funds to pay the rangers and militia had not yet been allocated, making the drafts more resented than ever. With all of these problems, peace negotiations took on added importance.⁴⁷

Clark employed three major initiatives in 1815 to advance peace and progress. First, on March 9, 1815, he declared the lands ceded by the Great and Little Osages in the 1808 Treaty at Fort Clark (Osage) “annexed to, and made a part of the country of St. Charles for all purposes of civil government whatsoever; the proprietary as well as sovereign rights to same having been regularly acquired by the United States, by the treaty above mentioned.”⁴⁸

Then, Governor Clark tried to strengthen ties with Indian allies and fulfill his duties as governor to keep white settlers from intruding on Indian lands. He issued a proclamation that unauthorized settlement of white persons on Indian lands was “in violation of laws and disregard of the executive authority of the territory” and it “can no longer be permitted.” Thus, while many Missouri constituents clamored for support against Indian depredations, real and imagined, Clark tried his best to uphold the law, opposing squatters who illegally occupied Indian lands. But who could Clark employ to enforce the law? The territorial militia over which he presided included many persons who stood to gain the most from illegally squatting on Indian land. Although the militia generally mustered out quickly to defend the frontier against Indian attack, they were reluctant to convene in order to reprimand their own ranks. Clark’s efforts to balance the demands of Indians, settlers, and the federal government proved an impossible task.⁴⁹ Moreover, by 1815 the Missouri population has swelled to 25,000 people, an increase of nearly five thousand in the five years since the 1810 census. These settlers elected representatives to the territorial assembly who supported squatters’ claims and undermined Clark’s attempts to protect Indian rights of occupancy. For the next five years, political opponents charged Clark with being too friendly with the Indians. It took considerable courage for Clark to take such an unpopular stand, sacrificing personal popularity, power, and monetary gain to support Indian land rights.⁵⁰

The third and most important measure involved Clark’s appointment as a federal diplomat to bring frontier hostilities to a close. On April 15, 1815, President Madison appointed Governor Clark of the Missouri Territory, Governor Ninian Edwards of the Illinois Territory, and Indian agent Auguste

Chouteau as peace commissioners to various Indian nations along the Missouri and Mississippi rivers.⁵¹ The commissioners notified the people of Missouri and Illinois about their appointments and encouraged citizens to refrain from hostile acts toward Indians that might hurt the commissioners’ success at negotiating peace. Citizens complained that Indian depredations had to be punished, and they expected Clark to do something about it.⁵² Clark and his fellow commissioners followed the counsel of Secretary of War James Monroe that they were not to seek trade or land concessions; they were to “confine this treaty to the sole object of peace.” Monroe dispatched \$20,000 worth of excellent-quality goods to make negotiations more palatable to the tribes. Later, both parties could arrange other mutually beneficial treaties.⁵³

Treaty-making involved attention to numerous details. The treaties were confined solely to reestablishing peace and reaffirming previous treaties. A majority of each tribe had to give their consent to the proposed actions of the treaty. Finally, Congress had to ratify the treaty in order for it to be regarded as legal and binding. Preparations for treaty-making necessitated deciding on a time and place, notifying the tribes involved, and, when possible, conducting the negotiations in Indian country. Once these preparations were under way, laborers were sent to build a council house, arbor, kitchen, bakery, and sleeping quarters for the participants. Adequate provisions and wages for the commissioners, secretary, agents, subagents, interpreters, workers, and principal chiefs and warriors had to be acquired, and contracts had to be signed to transport the goods to the council location. Numerous presents, such as tobacco, pipes, paint, medals, and even ammunition, had to be delivered to the site, along with provisions of beef, salt pork, flour, corn, and salt, which would be distributed regularly to the tribes to supply their wants and secure the influence and cooperation of the principal chiefs. Once the talks had taken place—with interpreters to relay each provision with precision—the commissioners sought as many Indian signatures as possible. It was especially important to court the young men so that they became active participants in the process and had a stake in the outcome.⁵⁴

Notifying all of the tribes was particularly challenging. Clark used Indian agents such as Thomas Forsyth and Manuel Lisa, army personnel such as Terry Berry and George H. Kennerly, and traders such as Frenchmen Pierre Turcotte and Edward LaGuthrie to dispatch invitations and talks to 37 Indian nations to inform them that peace had been

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established between England and the United States and to invite them to the peace talks. These men, in turn, spread the message farther by sending it on with Indian emissaries they contacted. Predictably, most tribes did not respond quickly or express much enthusiasm about attending the peace council at Portage des Sioux, although Manuel Lisa succeeded in improving the dispositions of the Sioux, Omahas, and Pawnees and gathered delegations from among those tribes for the treaty.⁵⁵

While these tribes and others treated the invitation with reserve, others, including the Kickapoos and Sacs and Foxes, expressed open hostility. A recalcitrant Sac and Fox band living near the Rock River murdered one of Berry's peace envoys. The commissioners also had to convince frontiersmen to maintain the peace. Many of them wanted to exact revenge for their losses of life, property, and livestock during the war, but they had been denied retaliation by the provisions of the Treaty of Ghent and the pleas of the commissioners.⁵⁶

In order to ensure tranquility at the negotiations, the commissioners simultaneously prepared for the best and the worst, making sure the Indians' friendship could be secured either by gifts or by force. Government factors George C. Sibley and John Johnson returned from Ohio with the presents. The commissioners' secretary also requested troops from Fort Bellefontaine, so General Daniel Bissell sent 275 regulars, under the command of Colonel John Miller, and two gunboats, the *Governor Clark* and the *Commodore Perry*, to anchor in the Missouri, near enough that their guns could be trained on the Indian encampments if difficulties arose.⁵⁷

Portage des Sioux had been selected as the council site because of its favorable location. The small French community founded in 1799 along the right bank of the Mississippi River lay about six miles above the mouth of the Missouri and near the confluence of the Illinois and Mississippi rivers. It was a relatively convenient place for tribes from the upper reaches of all three rivers to assemble easily. Portage des Sioux was also near enough to Fort Bellefontaine and St. Louis to facilitate transportation of supplies and military support.⁵⁸ Clark and Bissell visited Portage des Sioux on July 1, 1815, to find suitable places for the troops to encamp, to visit the Indian delegations that were already present, and to select a site for the council house. General Bissell recounted the evening visit: "from what little I have noticed of the deportment of the Indians since I arrived, I think they appear to attach much consequence to themselves, and hold the Americans in great contempt as warriors, little better than

Squaws." The general believed that the British evacuation of Prairie du Chien had strengthened the American cause and cautiously attested that it was "not unlikely all [Indians] may Subscribe to such a treaty as we wish, yet I do not believe we shall have peace long with them, or that those Indians will ever respect us as a Nation, untill they are well chastised."⁵⁹

The following months at Portage des Sioux were busy ones. The counseling and treaty-making with at least 19 different tribes took the entire summer and fall to complete. Some Indians began arriving after July 1. Abandoned by the British, these tribal representatives bravely faced the gunboats and endured the presence of US army troops. Cut off from British suppliers, with game diminishing rapidly and the trickle of white settlers turning into a small stream, many Indians saw the necessity of signing peace treaties to put an end to the conflict and to resume their lives. Governor Clark sent runners to bring in those not yet present and opened the council on July 10.⁶⁰

More than 2,000 Indians were encamped along the river when the council began. Clark, presiding in his dark suit and white ruffled shirt, opened with a forceful speech. He told the tribes that it was time to bury the tomahawk and put past transgressions aside in order to forge a lasting peace. He informed them of the government's plan to build forts along the Mississippi and Missouri rivers. After his fellow commissioners delivered their messages, Clark undertook the task of meeting with each tribe individually to reconcile any existing complaints and difficulties. The continuous drum-rolling and the never-ending deputations of one tribal delegation after another created an ostentatious display. Between July 18 and September 16, 1815, the commissioners signed 13 separate treaties asserting "perpetual peace and friendship" and a mutual forgiveness of all atrocities. They asked the Indians to "deliver up all the prisoners now in their hands to the officer commanding at St. Louis" and to acknowledge themselves and their tribe or nation "to be under the protection of the United States and no other nation, power or sovereign whatsoever." Nations signing included the Piankashaws, Potawatomis, Omahas, Kickapoos, Osages, Sacs of Missouri, Foxes, Ioways, and Sioux groups, including the Tétons, Sioux of the Lakes, Sioux of St. Peter's River, and Yanktons. The commissioners distributed solid silver medals to the chiefs and \$20,000 worth of trade goods, including blankets, flags, knives, rifles, fire steels, flint, powder, tobacco, pipes, and needles, to seal the negotiations.⁶¹

The formal language of the Portage des Sioux treaties

does not do justice to the tense negotiations that took place between government officials and tribal representatives. When chiefs from the Sac, Fox, and Kickapoo tribes did not bother to come, Clark was vexed. He called them “miserable” because they had followed British advice in warring on Americans, and he said that now there was no English trader among them, nor would there be in the future, because the United States was going to build forts all along the Mississippi. Clark demanded that the main Sac and Fox chiefs—Lemoite and Black Hawk—come in to negotiate within the next 30 days, or they would be considered hostile to the United States. He took several Sacs as hostages to ensure that the other tribal leaders came in to counsel with him. Clark dispatched agent Nicholas Boilvin and an interpreter to the upper Mississippi for a series of councils with the bands. Boilvin was successful in persuading several groups of Sacs to go to the council talks, but not all of them arrived at Portage des Sioux before the commissioners had adjourned.⁶²

In the spring of 1816, a Sac deputation led by Chief Lemoite arrived. The Sacs did not approve of Clark’s treatment of Lemoite’s tribal members. The chief was not happy that his warriors had been held under arrest with the threat of death if he did not appear. The Sacs were not the only ones who were late to arrive. Between May and June of 1816, ten tribes who had not appeared at the council the previous year signed peace treaties in St. Louis, including the Winnebagos, the Ottawas, and eight more bands of Sioux. Still, Clark’s heavy-handed method of taking Indian hostages had created resentment among the Sacs and Foxes allied with the British that continued to strain relations between the United States and the British band of the tribe.⁶³

Clark’s blunt treatment of the hostile Sacs and Foxes can be juxtaposed with his much friendlier discussion with the majority of those at Portage des Sioux. The tribute shown by the full military burial of Lakota chief Black Buffalo and the eloquent funeral oration of Omaha chief Big Elk helped to assuage the sorrow affiliated with his passing and furthered efforts to conclude treaties.⁶⁴ Moreover, after making an example of the Sacs and Foxes, Clark conveyed to other nations a clear notion of the position of tribes who refused to make peace with the Americans. He is reported to have said, “It requires time and a little smoking with Indians, if you wish to have peace with them.”⁶⁵

Clark served as commissioner for 25 treaties during his tenure as territorial governor, approximately half of which were signed at the Portage des Sioux Treaty Council in

1815. These important treaties maintained Indian alliances or neutrality, helped end frontier hostilities after the conflict, and established tribal trading arrangements at nearby government factories. When Clark had first arrived in St. Louis in 1803 to explore the Louisiana Purchase, St. Louis was a sleepy little French fur trading depot hugging the Mississippi River, and most of the European population lived along the river. By the end of his terms as territorial governor less than two decades later, the immigrant population had swelled to nearly 66,000, with American settlements from Fort Osage to Boone’s Lick and across the state. From when he first took the oath of office in 1813, the number of counties had tripled from ten to fifteen. Missourians clamored for statehood, and on March 6, 1820, a law provided for a constitutional convention with the election to be held in August. Clark became a candidate for governor.⁶⁶

In an open letter to Missouri newspapers announcing his candidacy on July 2, 1820, Clark told the people of Missouri, “During the last seven years I have been Governor of the Territory, and the period has been one of uncommon danger to the inhabitants, and of peculiar difficulty to the executive department. Our country was engaged in war with the British and their Indian allies, and this remote and isolated territory was exposed to a more than equal share of the common danger, and with a less than equal share of the common means for defense. It presented a frontier of many hundred miles in circumference, thinly sprinkled with inhabitants and surrounded with Indian nations stimulated to war by their own love of blood and plunder and the wicked arts of British emissaries.” Clark concluded, “I flatter myself that this country has enjoyed comparative safety and suffered less than any new country has ever yet suffered during the progress of an Indian war.” Clark’s nephew, John O’Fallon, campaigning on behalf of his uncle, told the people of Missouri, “The personal character of Governor Clark contributed to this comparative security. He is better known to the north and Western Indians than any man in America; and known to them under a character which commands their fear and respect, as a man courageous and skilful in war; mild and just in peace.”⁶⁷ Unfortunately for Clark, the majority of the voting population arrived after the peace treaties of Portage des Sioux, and their principle interests had been acquiring land from the land office, where they had favorable dealings with the other candidate, Alexander McNair. Ultimately, Clark’s friendship with Indians and his high-profile attempts to protect their lands from white encroachment eventually

cost him the state's first gubernatorial election in 1820.⁶⁸

Clark generally liked Indians, and they generally liked him. Over the course of his life he met hundreds of them and knew many of them very well. Although he was not always able to help them according to their own interests, his actions symbolize those of a sentimental imperialist. Clark built an Indian museum behind his St. Louis home on the southeast corner of Pine and Main to house his collection of Indian curiosities, including Indian headdresses, tomahawks, breast plates, bows and arrows, peace pipes, and so on. His home was a crossroads of information, with government officials, traders, Indian delegations, and townspeople constantly visiting. His five-decade public career spanned a lifetime of public service from his enlistment as a private in the Kentucky militia in 1789, a lieutenant on the Lewis and Clark expedition, to a breveted brigadier general of the Missouri Militia during the War of 1812. In the decades following the Portage des Sioux treaties, Clark conducted other treaties that ultimately dispossessed and removed nearly all the Indians from the Missouri and Arkansas territories. From 1807 until his death in 1838, Clark fostered friendly Indian-white relations as Indian agent, Missouri territorial governor, and superintendent of Indian affairs. Over those decades, William Clark occupied the central position in a territorial government aimed at implementing federal policy. He was the fulcrum within a triangle consisting of Indians, settlers, and the federal government, each pulling in a different direction. Public lands, military affairs, and Indian affairs all fell under his jurisdiction, and although he was vested with a great deal of discretionary power, the conflicting policies relating to those three areas proved difficult to balance. ■

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NOTES

1. William Clark, September 25, 1804, Gary E. Moulton, ed., *The Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition*, 13 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983-2001), 3:113. The Lakota encounter between September 24-29 covers pages 107-28; James P. Ronda, *Lewis and Clark among the Indians*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 27-41; James P. Ronda, "Tough Times at the Bad," *We Proceeded On* 28, no. 2 (May 2002): 12-21; Craig Howe, "Lewis and Clark among the Tetons: Smoking Out What Really Happened," *Wicazo Sa Review* 19, no. 1 (2004): 47-72.
2. Samuel G. Drake, *Biography and History of the Indians of North America*, 11th ed. (Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey & Co, 1851), 633.

3. I am grateful to Jerry Garrett and Mark Kelly for helping me locate and visit many of these War of 1812 sites in Missouri and Illinois.

4. The historiography for the War of 1812 has grown significantly over the past decade. Lorna Hainsworth, "The Corps and the War of 1812," provides information on the Corps of Discovery's members and their involvement in the war (copy in author's possession). Additional scholarly publications include: Jeremy Black, *The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009); Donald Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, eds., *Encyclopedia of the War of 1812* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997; 2nd ed., 2004); Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989); Jon Latimer, *1812: War with America* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007); Robert Malcomson, *Historical Dictionary of the War of 1812* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006); J. C. A. Stagg, *The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010).

5. Colin G. Calloway, *Pen and Ink Witchcraft: Treaties and Treaty-making in American Indian History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Wiley Sword, *President Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985); Robert J. Miller, *Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas Jefferson, Lewis and Clark, and Manifest Destiny* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Robert J. Miller, "The Doctrine of Discovery: Manifest Destiny, and American Indians," in *Why You Can't Teach United States History without American Indians*, ed. Susan Sleeper-Smith (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015): 87-100.

6. Gary E. Moulton, ed., *The Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition*, 13 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983-2001); Donald Jackson, ed., *Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, with Related Documents, 1783-1854*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978); James P. Ronda, *Lewis and Clark among the Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984).

7. Meanwhile, other expeditions explored or attempted to explore the other major rivers of the new territory including the upper Mississippi, Platte, Arkansas, and Red rivers. Jay H. Buckley, "Jeffersonian Explorers in the Trans-Mississippi West: Zebulon Pike in Perspective," in *Zebulon Pike, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West*, eds. Matthew L. Harris and Jay H. Buckley (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 101-38.

8. Examples of Jefferson's public and private view on this policy are Jefferson, "Address to the Wolf and People of the Mandan Nation, December 30, 1806" and Thomas Jefferson to William H. Harrison, February 27, 1803.

9. Charles J. Kappler, ed., "Treaty with the Sauk and Foxes, 1804," in *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904-13), 2:74-77; Robert M. Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," *Journal of the Early Republic* 22 (Fall 2002): 405-35; Robert M. Owens, *Mr. Jefferson's Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); David Curtis Skaggs, *William Henry Harrison and the Conquest of the Ohio Country: Frontier Fighting in the War of 1812* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014). See also Clarence E. Carter, ed., *Territorial Papers of the United States*, vol. 13, *The Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, 1803-1806* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948).

10. Russell M. Magnaghi, "The Belle Fontaine Indian Factory, 1805-1808," *Missouri Historical Review* 75 (July 1981): 396-416. For a thorough description of the factory, see Clark, Description of the Factory Buildings, Belle Fontaine, March 6, 1809, M-6, RG 107, National Archives.

11. Jay H. Buckley, *William Clark: Indian Diplomat* (Norman: University of Oklahoma press, 2008). See also Harlow Lindley, "William Clark: The Indian Agent," *Bulletin of the Missouri Historical Society* 2 (1908-1909): 63-74, and *Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, 1908-1909* (Cedar Rapids, IA: 1910), 2:63-75; John L. Loos, "William Clark: Indian Agent," *Kansas Quarterly* 3 (Fall 1971): 33-37; Jerome O. Steffen, *William Clark: Jeffersonian Man on the Frontier* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977).

12. Thomas Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, August 20, 1808, quoted in James Anderson, "Fort Osage: An Incident of Territorial Missouri," *Bulletin of the Missouri Historical Society* 4 (April 1948): 174–76.
13. An Act for the Establishing Trading Houses with the Indian Tribes, T-58, RG 75, NA.
14. Kate L. Gregg, ed., *Westward with Dragoons: The Journal of William Clark on His Expedition to Establish Fort Osage, August 25 to September 22, 1808* (Fulton, MO: Ovid Bell Press, 1937; Ann Rogers, "Clark's Fort Osage Journal," *We Proceeded On* 25 (August 1999): 24–28; Andrew C. Isenberg, "The Market Revolution in the Borderlands: George Champlin Sibley in Missouri and New Mexico, 1808–1826," *Journal of the Early Republic* 21, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 445–65.
15. Clark to Dearborn, September 23, 1808, in Clarence E. Carter, ed., *Territorial Papers of the United States*, vol. 14, *The Territory of Louisiana–Missouri, 1806–1814* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), 14:224–28; Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 271–72; J. Frederick Fausz, "Becoming 'a Nation of Quakers': The Removal of the Osage Indians from Missouri," *Gateway Heritage Magazine* 21 (Summer 2000), 35; Gregg, *Westward with Dragoons*, 40–41, 59–60, 64–68.
16. Clark to Dearborn, September 23, 1808, in Carter, ed., *Territorial Papers*, 14:227.
17. Clark to Jonathan Clark, October 5, 1808, in James J. Holmberg, ed., *Dear Brother: Letters of William Clark to Jonathan Clark* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 154.
18. Grant Foreman, ed., *A Traveler in Indian Territory: The Journal of Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Late Major-General in the United States Army* (Cedar Rapids, IA: Torch Press, 1930), 56.
19. Fausz, "Becoming 'a Nation of Quakers,'" 37.
20. "Tecumseh Speaks Out Against Land Cessions, 1810," quoted in Samuel G. Drake, *Biography and History of the Indians of North America* (Boston: Anti-quarian Institute, 1837), 5:21–22. Tecumseh conveyed similar sentiments on his nationwide tour. John Sugden, "Early Pan-Indianism: Tecumseh's Tour of the Indian Country, 1811–1812," *American Indian Quarterly* 10, no. 4 (Fall 1986): 273–304.
21. James Madison and James Monroe, Appointment of Clark as Governor of Missouri Territory, June 16 and July 1, 1813, Clark Papers, MHS; Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 14:679; John Armstrong to Clark, April 8, 1813, in Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 14:655–56.
22. Clark to Morrison, July 10, 1813; Morrison to Clark, July 15, 1813; Clark to Chouteau, July 16, 1813, Superintendency Records, KSHS.
23. Forsyth to Clark, July 20, 1813; Boilvin to Clark, July 25, 1813, Superintendency Records, KSHS.
24. Carl Benn, *Native Memoirs from the War of 1812: Black Hawk and William Apess* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 46; Patrick J. Jung, "Toward the Black Hawk War: The Sauk and Fox Indians and the War of 1812," *Michigan Historical Review* 38, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 27–52. See also Colin G. Calloway, *Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783–1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987); Robert S. Allen, "His Majesty's Indian Allies: Native Peoples, The British Crown and the War of 1812," *Michigan Historical Review* 14, no. 2 (March 1988): 1–24; John P. Bowes, "Transformation and Transition: American Indians and the War of 1812 in the Lower Great Lakes," *Journal of Military History* 76, no. 4 (October 2012): 1129–46. Clark to John Mason, December 13, 1813, T-58, RG 75, NA. Most depredations, including those of the Winnebagos who killed two Americans and robbed a trading facility near Prairie du Chien, simply show the unpredictability of where attacks would occur and prompted Clark to seek more effectual measures for the protection of the frontier. See, for examples, Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 14:518–20, 691–98.
25. The last occupied American fort west of Lake Michigan, Fort Madison, had been under constant threat of attack since its establishment in 1808. As early as 1809, Clark reported that his spies had learned that Sacs and Winnebagos were intending to attack the fort and destroy the factory. Since Clark had helped establish Fort Osage, he had not been involved in the Fort Madison site selection. Upon visiting the post, he declared that it was in "a bad state of defence, the pickets being so low that the Indians could with great ease jump over them, and no Blockhouses for Defence." Clark to Secretary of War, April 5 and 29, 1809, in Carter, ed., *Territorial Papers*, 14:260–66. Although it had withstood countless assaults by Winnebago, Sac, and Fox war parties, it was deemed indefensible because a nearby height of land allowed besiegers to look into and fire upon the fort. The troops from the fort withdrew, setting it on fire before they floated down the Mississippi. With the loss of this fort, Missouri's northern flank was fully exposed. Donald Jackson, "Old Fort Madison-1808-1813," *Palimpsest* 47 (1966): 1–63. John Hansman, "An Archeological Problem at Old Fort Madison," *Plains Anthropologist* 32, no. 117 (August 1987): 217–31; "Fort Madison," *Annals of Iowa* 12, no. 3 (July 1874): 236–39.
26. Clark to Eustis, February 13, 1812; Howard to Eustis, March 19, 1812, quoted in Julius W. Pratt, "Fur Trade Strategy and the American Left Flank in the War of 1812," *Missouri Historical Review* 40 (January 1935): 251. The regular troops were located as follows before their removal: 134 at Fort Bellefontaine, 63 at Fort Osage, and 44 at Fort Madison; Robert W. Frazer, *Fort of the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), 70–74; R. Douglas Hurt, *Nathan Boone and the American Frontier* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998), 78–108.
27. During the War of 1812, the Missouri Territory supplied 1,556 cavalry men, the majority of whom were paid with bounty land in Arkansas, Illinois, and Missouri.
28. On April 17, 1810, President Madison had appointed Benjamin Howard to serve as governor of the upper Louisiana Territory (later renamed the Missouri Territory). In 1812, Howard resigned his post to serve as brigadier general over the Eighth Military Department of American forces. Howard fell ill and died on September 18, 1814, and was eventually interred in Bellefontaine Cemetery. He is the namesake of Howard County, Missouri.
29. Julia Clark to George Hancock, February 27, 1814, Eleanor Glasgow Voorhis Collection, MHS.
30. Wilbur M. Shankland, "General William Clark: Last Territorial Governor of Missouri," talk given March 14, 1964, manuscript in the War of 1812 Papers, Missouri Historical Society.
31. Larry E. Morris, "The Corps of Discovery: 200 Years After the Expedition," *American History* (April 2003): 44–56, 58, 60; quote from page 58. Larry E. Morris, *The Fate of the Corps: What Became of the Lewis and Clark Explorers after the Expedition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 120–21.
32. Sister Marietta Jennings, *A Pioneer Merchant of St. Louis 1810–1820: The Business Careers of Christian Wilt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 107–10.
33. Clark to Secretary of War Armstrong, January 16, February 2, and June 5 and 28, 1814, in Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 14:727–28, 738–40, 768–69, 775–76.
34. Clark to John Comegys, November 20, 1813, Clark Papers, MHS; *Missouri Gazette*, September 4, October 2, and November 6, 1813.
35. *Missouri Gazette*, May 28, 1814; Clark to Secretary of War, April 17, 1815, Clark Papers, MHS.
36. Clark to Secretary of War Armstrong, February 24 and December 18, 1813, in Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 14:632–33, 723–24.
37. Kate L. Gregg, "The War of 1812 on the Missouri Frontier," *Missouri Historical Review* 38 (October 1938): 3–22; 38 (January 1939): 184–202; 38 (April 1939): 326–48, pt. 3, 328–29.
38. Clark to William Eustis, February 13 and March 22, 1812; Benjamin Howard to Eustis, March 19, 1812, quoted in Pratt, "Fur Trade Strategy," 250; Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 14:745–48, 762–63; Gary C. Anderson, *Kinsmen of Another Kind: Dakota-White Relations in the Upper Mississippi Valley, 1650–1862* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 86–95.
39. *Missouri Gazette*, June 18 and July 23 and 30, 1814. Clark's brother George Rogers congratulated him on the results of the Prairie du Chien campaign. George Rogers Clark to Clark, July 30, 1814, Clark Papers, MHS; *Missouri Gazette*, May 21 and June 4 and 18, 1814.
40. Quoted in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), 4:143.
41. After the Treaty of Ghent, the British abandoned the fort in the summer in 1815, burning it to the ground. Clark to Secretary of War Armstrong, July 31 and September 18, 1814, in Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 14:781, 786–87.

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42. The Treaty of Ghent was signed December 24, 1814, but news of it did not reach America until after the Battle of New Orleans, which was fought January 8, 1815. President Madison signed the treaty on February 16, 1815, and the Senate ratified it the following day.
43. "Treaty of Ghent, 1814," *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, vol. 2, Hunter Miller, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931). The War of 1812 officially ended on February 16, 1815, when President Madison ratified the Treaty of Ghent.
44. War of 1812 Folio, General Orders, MHS; Secretary of War to Clark, March 11, 1815, in Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 15: 14.
45. Christian Wilt to Uncle, August 6, 1814, Letter Books of Christian Wilt, No. 125, MHS.
46. Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 15:23.
47. Monroe to Clark, Edwards, and Chouteau, March 11, 1815, Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 15: 14–15.
48. John J. O'Fallon, "Brief Notices of the Principal Events in the Public Life of Governor Clark," *St. Louis Enquirer*, August 9, 1820, 14.
49. Governor William Clark, "A Proclamation," December 4, 1815, in Carter, ed., *Territorial Papers, Louisiana-Missouri Territory, 1815–1821* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 15: 192.
50. Resolutions of the Territorial Assembly, January 22, 1816, "To the Honourable Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress," in Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 15:106–07; Resolutions Concerning the Indian Title in the Counties of St. Genevieve and Cape Girardeau, Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 15: 235.
51. The Chouteau family, led by Auguste and his brother Pierre, who had served as the agent to the Osages, proved invaluable in keeping certain tribes peaceful or at least neutral during the conflict. Chouteau, February 21, 1816, in Grant Foreman, ed., "Notes of Auguste Chouteau on Boundaries of Various Indian Nations," *Glimpses of the Past* 7 (October-December 1940): 119-40, esp. 122–40.
52. Monroe to Clark, March 11, 1815, Clark Papers, MHS.
53. Other exceptions included the Indian-removal treaties of the 1820s and 1830s. Vine J. Deloria, Jr., and David E. Wilkins, *Tribes, Treaties, and Constitutional Tribulations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 59–60; Monroe to Clark, Edwards, and Chouteau, March 11, 1815, and Monroe to Clark, March 25, 1815, *American State Papers: Indian Affairs*, 2:6.
54. Monroe to Clark, Edwards, and Chouteau, March 11, 1815, and Monroe to Clark, March 25, 1815, *American State Papers: Indian Affairs*, 2:6.
55. Clark to William Crawford, December 11, 1815, Clark Papers, MHS.
56. *Missouri Gazette*, April 29 and May 24, 1815.
57. Gregg, "War of 1812," pt. 3, 345–46.
58. Spanish Lieutenant Governor Zenon Trudeau and François Saucier established Portage des Sioux in 1799 in reaction to American plans to build Fort Belle Fountain. The French name derives from the overland route between the Missouri River and Mississippi River used by a band of Sioux who portaged their canoes two or three miles over the narrow neck rather than paddling 25 miles downriver to the confluence and then upstream.
59. Daniel Bissell to Andrew Jackson, July 2, 1815, Bissell Papers, MHS.
60. Robert L. Fisher, "The Treaties of Portage des Sioux." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 19 (March 1933): 495-508; Francis P. Prucha, *American Indian Treaties: A History of A Political Anomaly*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 133.
61. Three other commissioners, William Harrison, Duncan McArthur, and John Graham, treated with Indians of the Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan territories. In September at Spring Wells, near Detroit, they made treaties with the Delawares, Chippewas, Ottawas, Potawatomis, Miamis, Senecas, Wyandots, and Shawnees. Fisher, "The Treaties of Portage des Sioux," 501–2; *American State Papers: Indian Affairs*, 2:6–12; *Missouri Gazette*, July 8 and 15, 1815; Kappler, *Indian Affairs*, 2:117–18.
62. Fisher, "The Treaties of Portage des Sioux," 502–3.
63. Indian Commissioners to William Crawford, June 17, 1816, in Carter, *Territorial Papers*, 17:352–56.

64. Landon Y. Jones, "The Council That Changed the West: William Clark at Portage des Sioux," *Gateway Heritage* 24, no. 2-3 (2003-04): 88-95, esp. 92–94.
65. Quoted in John L. Loos, "The Career of William Clark." MA thesis, University of Nebraska (Lincoln), 1940, 71.
66. Walter R. Smith, "General William Clark, Territorial Governor of Missouri," *Bulletin Washington University Association* 4 (1906): 45–69; Jerome O. Steffen, "William Clark: A New Perspective of Missouri Territorial Politics, 1813–1820," *Missouri Historical Review* 47 (January 1973): 171–97.
67. John J. O'Fallon, "Brief Notices of the Principal Events in the Public Life of Governor Clark," *St. Louis Enquirer*, August 9, 1820, 12.
68. William Clark, "To the People of Missouri," *St. Louis Enquirer*, August 9, 1820. William E. Foley, "After the Applause: William Clark's Failed Gubernatorial Campaign," *Gateway Heritage* 24 (Fall 2003–2004): 104–11. Clark was defeated by Alexander McNair.

LCTHF Announces Inaugural Moulton Lecture

The Lewis and Clark Trail Heritage Foundation (LCTHF) has established the Dr. Gary E Moulton Lecture in honor of Gary Moulton, longtime member and editor of the *Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition*. Dr. Jay Buckley will give the inaugural lecture on Saturday May 12, 2018. At the invitation of Mark Weekley, superintendent of the Lewis and Clark National Historic Trail, the lecture will be delivered at the Trail headquarters at 601 Riverfront Drive in Omaha, Nebraska.

The LCTHF has also established the Moulton Lecture Fund. Contributions may be directed to the Moulton Lecture Fund through the LCTHF website at lewisandclark.org or mailed to the LCTHF, PO Box 3434, Great Falls, Montana 59403. Please call 888-701-3434 or 406-454-1234 for more information.